A REMAINING DEFINITIONS AND PROOFS

A.1 Remaining Meta-functions

 $\texttt{contract_for}(\sigma, b) = (n, \checkmark) \text{ if } \exists ee \mapsto \tilde{l}\checkmark \in \texttt{blame}_{\sigma}(\sigma). \qquad \texttt{where } \texttt{ep}(ee) = b.y \land \texttt{nm}(ee) = n$ contract_for(σ , b) = (n, x) if ($\exists ee \mapsto \tilde{l}x \in blame_{\sigma}(\sigma)$.

where $ep(ee) = b.y \wedge nm(ee) = n$ $\land (\forall ee' \mapsto \tilde{l}'c \in \text{blame}_{\sigma}(\sigma). \text{ if } ep(ee') = b$ then nm(ee) = k and c = x)

 $ep(a.r \text{ satisfies } n\langle v \rangle) = a.r$ ep(a.i expects se) = a.i $nm(a.r \text{ satisfies } n\langle v \rangle) = n$ nm(a.i expects se) = nm(se)

names metafunction.

names(
$$a$$
) = { a }

names(mon^l(σ , P^{a})) = {a}

names $(\hat{m} \text{ to } a) = \emptyset$ names $(m \text{ to } a) = \emptyset$

 $\frac{\widetilde{a_1} = \mathsf{names}(P)}{\mathsf{names}(P \parallel Q) = \widetilde{a_1} \cup \widetilde{a_2}}$

labels metafunction.

$$labels(a) = \emptyset$$

$$labels(mon^{l}(\sigma, P^{a})) = \{l\}$$

labels(*m* to *a*) = \emptyset labels(\hat{m} to *a*) = \emptyset

$$\overline{l_1} = \text{labels}(P) \qquad \overline{l_2} = \text{labels}(Q)$$
$$\text{labels}(P \parallel Q) = \overline{l_1} \cup \overline{l_2}$$

A.2 Congruence Relation

$$P = P$$

$$P \parallel Q = Q \parallel P$$

$$P \parallel Q = P' \parallel Q'$$

$$P \parallel Q = P' \parallel Q'$$

Well-formedness $\forall (a \text{ satisfies } k \langle v \rangle \mapsto \checkmark) \in C. \ C(a) = k$ $C \prec C$ $\frac{P \vdash_{S}^{C} P}{\vdash_{S}^{C} P \text{ wf}}$ $\begin{array}{ccc} P \vdash^C_S Q & P \vdash^C_S R \\ \mathsf{names}(Q) \cap \mathsf{names}(R) = \emptyset & \mathsf{labels}(Q) \cap \mathsf{labels}(R) = \emptyset \end{array}$ $P \vdash_{S}^{C} Q \parallel R$ $l \neq \dagger$ $S = \operatorname{spec}(\sigma)$ $conf_{\sigma} \leq C$ $\forall se. se \in dom(blame_{\sigma}) \text{ iff } se \in dom(prov_{\sigma})$ $\forall se \mapsto \tilde{l} \in \text{blame}_{\sigma}, \ l \in \tilde{l}. \ P \Vdash \text{blame} \ l \text{ for } se$ $\forall #n \text{ from } b \text{ expects } se \mapsto \widetilde{l} \in blame_{\sigma}, \ l \in \widetilde{l}. \ P \Vdash blame \ l \text{ for } se$ $\forall a \mapsto n \in \mathcal{C}. \ a \ \text{satisfies} \ k \langle \mathbf{v} \rangle \mapsto \checkmark \in \operatorname{conf}_{\sigma}$ $P \vdash^C_{S} \operatorname{mon}^l(\sigma, P^a)$ $m = \operatorname{req} \# n$ from b : s to a or $m = \operatorname{reply} \#n \text{ from } b : s \text{ to } a$ $P \vdash_{S}^{C} a$ $P \vdash_{S}^{C} m$ to a $\{\text{identified}(m) \mapsto c\} \leq C$ k = C(a) $\forall l \in \tilde{l}. P \Vdash$ **blame** l for from(a) satisfies $k \langle index(m) \rangle$ $\forall l \in \widetilde{l_{id}}$. $P \Vdash$ blame *l* for identified(*m*) $P \vdash_{S}^{C} m$ with {se-blame:= \tilde{l} ; id-conf:=c; id-blame:= $\tilde{l_{id}}$ } to b

A.3

First, note that we define well-formedness judgment $P \vdash_S^C P'$, where *P* is the entire process, and *P'* is some subprocess of *P*. For brevity, we used wellformedness judgment $\vdash_S^C P$ wf where *P* was the entire process, and so treat that as equivalent to $P \vdash_S^C P$.

LEMMA A.1 (PRESERVATION OF WELL-FORMEDNESS OVER CONGRUENCE). If $P \vdash_{S}^{C} P'$ and P = P'' and P' = P''' then $P'' \vdash_{S}^{C} P'''$.

PROOF. The congruence relation only changes the order of the processes. The well-formedness relation is not sensitive to ordering of the processes.

LEMMA A.2 (lift PRESERVES STORE WELL-FORMEDNESS). If $\mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma, P^{a})] \vdash_{S}^{C} \operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma, P^{a})$ and σ', m with {se-blame:= \tilde{l} ; id-conf:=c; id-blame:= \tilde{l}_{id} } to $b = \operatorname{lift}_{\sigma}(k, c, m, l)$ and (if from $(m) \neq a$ then $l = \dagger$), then

 $\forall se \mapsto \tilde{l} \in \text{blame}_{\sigma'}, \ l' \in \tilde{l}. \ \mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l'}(\sigma, P^a)] \Vdash \text{blame } l' \text{ for } se \text{ and} \\ \forall (\#n \text{ from } c \text{ expects } se) \mapsto \tilde{l} \in \text{blame}_{\sigma'}, \ l' \in \tilde{l}. \ \mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l'}(\sigma, P^a)] \Vdash \text{ blame } l' \text{ for } se \end{cases}$

PROOF. By inspection of the lift rule given, there are two entries that can be updated: the service endpoint, and se_{id} . We first show $\forall l' \in \tilde{l}_s$. $\mathcal{P}[\mathsf{mon}^l(\sigma', P^a)] \Vdash$ blame l' for se, then $\forall l' \in \tilde{l}_{id}$. $\mathcal{P}[\mathsf{mon}^l(\sigma', P^a)] \Vdash$ blame l' for se_{id} .

For the well-formedness of *se*, we take cases on if $se \in dom(blame_{\sigma})$:

• Case $se \notin dom(blame_{\sigma})$:

It is the case then that $\tilde{l_s} = \{l\}$. Due to well-formedness, we have that

 $\forall se. se \in dom(blame_{\sigma}) \text{ iff } se \in dom(prov_{\sigma})$

It will be the case then that $se \notin dom(prov_{\sigma})$ so $pe_s = b$ intro. If b = a we can form the following derivation:

$$prov_{\sigma'}(se) = a$$
 intro

 $\mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})] \Vdash$ **blame** l for se

Otherwise we are in a partially deployed case (based on the reduction rules that call lift). As a result, in these cases $l_a = \dagger$. So we can form the partial deployment derivation:

$$prov_{\sigma'}(se) = b \text{ intro}$$
$$\mathcal{P}[mon^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})] \Vdash \text{ blame } \dagger \text{ for } se$$

• Case $se \in dom(blame_{\sigma})$:

Due to well-formedness, $\forall se \in \text{blame}_{\sigma}$, then $\forall l' \in \tilde{l}_s$. $\mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^l(\sigma, P^a)] \Vdash \text{blame } l' \text{ for } se$. Additionally, since no provenance or blame or provenance information is overwritten the derivation must hold for σ' , so, $\forall l' \in \tilde{l}_s$. $\mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^l(\sigma', P^a)] \Vdash \text{blame } l' \text{ for } re$.

Next we show the well-formedness of se_{id} . We also perform a case analysis on the type of the message together with if $se_{id} \in dom(blame_{\sigma})$.

- Case type(m) == req ∧ se_{id} ∈ dom(blame_σ): Due to well-formedness of the store, we have that ∀se → *l* ∈ blame_σ, *l* ∈ *l*. 𝒫[mon^l(σ, P^a)] ⊨ blame *l* for se, so it must be the case that ∀l' ∈ *l*_{id}. 𝒫[mon^l(σ, P^a)] ⊨ blame *l'* for se_{id}. As a result, since the entry is replaced with itself along with its provenance (i.e., no information is replaced), the well-formedness condition still holds.
- Case type $(m) = \operatorname{req} \land se_{id} \notin dom(\operatorname{blame}_{\sigma})$: It is the case then that $\widetilde{l_{id}} = \{l\}$. Due to well-formedness, we have that $\forall se. se \in dom(\operatorname{blame}_{\sigma})$ iff $se \in dom(\operatorname{prov}_{\sigma})$. As a result $se_{id} \notin dom(\operatorname{prov}_{\sigma})$.

Next we consider if b = a. It will be the case that $prov_{\sigma'}(se_{id}) = a$ intro. So the derivation for this case is:

$$\frac{\mathsf{prov}_{\sigma'} = a \text{ intro}}{\mathcal{P}[\mathsf{mon}^l(\sigma', P^a)] \Vdash \mathbf{blame} \ l \text{ for } se_{id}}$$

Otherwise, if $b \neq a$, we are in a partially deployed case (based on the reduction rules that call lift). As a result, in these cases $l_a = \dagger$. So we can form the partial deployment derivation:

$$prov_{\sigma'} = b$$
 intro

$$\mathcal{P}[\mathsf{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})] \Vdash \mathbf{blame} \dagger \mathbf{for} \ se_{id}$$

- Case type(m) == reply ∧ se_{id} ∈ dom(blame_σ): The same reasoning applies for the case if type(m) == req and se_{id} ∈ dom(blame_σ) as the entry is looked up in the same fashion for requests and replies.
- Case type $(m) == \operatorname{reply} \land se_{id} \notin dom(\operatorname{blame}_{\sigma})$: It is the case then that $\widetilde{l_{id}} = \widetilde{l_s}$. From well-formedness of the store, $\forall l' \in \widetilde{l_s}$. $\mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^l(\sigma, P^a)] \Vdash$ blame l' for se. Also from store well-formedness, it must be the case that $se_{id} \notin dom(\operatorname{blame}_{\sigma})$ as $\forall se. se \in dom(\operatorname{blame}_{\sigma})$ iff $se \in dom(\operatorname{prov}_{\sigma})$. Because of this, we know that $\operatorname{prov}_{\sigma'}(se_{id}) =$ se intro.

We can directly set up the derivation for an unconfirmed service identification for each $l' \in \tilde{l_s}$:

$$prov_{\sigma'}(se_{id}) = (se \text{ intro}) \qquad \frac{(from well-formedness)}{\mathcal{P}[mon^{l}(\sigma, P^{a})] \Vdash \text{ blame } l' \text{ for } se}$$
$$\mathcal{P}[mon^{l}(\sigma, P^{a})] \Vdash \text{ blame } l' \text{ for } se_{id}$$

LEMMA A.3 (lower PRESERVES STORE WELL-FORMEDNESS). If $P \vdash_{S}^{C} \operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a}) \parallel m$ with {se-blame:= \tilde{l}_{i} id-conf:=c; id-blame:= \tilde{l}_{id} } to b and $\sigma', m = \operatorname{lower}_{\sigma}(k, c, m \text{ with } \{\operatorname{se-blame:=I}; id-\operatorname{conf:=}c; id-blame:=I_{id}\}$ to b) then $\forall se \mapsto \tilde{l} \in \operatorname{blame}_{\sigma'}, l' \in \tilde{l}. \mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l'}(\sigma, P^{a})] \Vdash \operatorname{blame} l' \text{ for } se$ and $\forall (\#n \text{ from } c \text{ expects } se) \mapsto \tilde{l} \in \operatorname{blame}_{\sigma'}, l' \in \tilde{l}. \mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l'}(\sigma, P^{a})] \Vdash \operatorname{blame} l' \text{ for } se$

PROOF. Since the message is well-formed, there will be blame consistent with provenance for the reply and service identified. Additionally, the provenance information in the receiving adapter is not overwritten so any existing derivations of blame consistent with provenance will still hold. As a result, the services added to the store will still have a valid derivation of blame consistent with provenance.

LEMMA A.4 (lift AND lower PRESERVE STATE). If $\mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma, P^{a})] \vdash_{S}^{C} \operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})$ and either $\sigma', \hat{m} = \operatorname{lift}_{\sigma}(k, c, m, l)$ or $\sigma', m = \operatorname{lower}_{\sigma}(k, c, \hat{m})$, then

(1)
$$S = \operatorname{spec}(\sigma')$$

(2) $\forall se. se \in dom(blame_{\sigma'})$ iff $se \in dom(prov_{\sigma'})$

(3) $\forall a \mapsto k \in C$. *a* satisfies $k \langle v \rangle \mapsto \checkmark \in \text{conf}_{\sigma'}$

PROOF. For the first case, $S = \text{spec}(\sigma')$, it is clear from the store updates in the metafunctions that the store is not changed.

For the second case, $\forall se. se \in dom(blame_{\sigma'})$ iff $re \in dom(prov_{\sigma'})$, it is clear by inspection that the updates to the blame registry and provenance registry affect the same domain of services.

For the third case, $\forall a \mapsto n \in C$. a satisfies $k \langle v \rangle \mapsto \sqrt{\epsilon} \operatorname{conf}_{\sigma'}$, services added to the blame registry do not ever become unconfirmed after becoming confirmed (i.e., note the usage and

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definition of the confirmed_or function). As a result, if σ had this property, then no replacement could make the service become unconfirmed so it will still hold for σ' .

THEOREM A.5 (PRESERVATION OF WELL-FORMEDNESS). If $P \vdash_{S}^{C} P P \rightarrow P'$ then $P' \vdash_{S}^{C} P'$.

PROOF. By case analysis on step used.

Case Black-box Send Request

From the definition of the rule, we have

$$\frac{n \text{ fresh}}{\mathcal{P}[a] \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}[a] \parallel \text{ request } \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b]}$$

where $P = \mathcal{P}[a]$ and $P' = \mathcal{P}[a] \parallel request \#n$ from *a* containing *s* to *b*]. We also have from our congruence rules that

 $\mathcal{P}[\boxed{a} \parallel \text{request } \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b] = \\ \mathcal{P}[\boxed{a}] \parallel \text{request } \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b$

We also have that $P \vdash_S^C P$. We can re-use the proof derivation of that to construct $P' \vdash_S^C \mathcal{P}[\underline{a}]$. P' can be used in place of P on the left-hand side as it contains the same relevant processes to the blame-consistent-with-provenance relation. We can now construct a new derivation for P'. We can use the base message well-formed rule along with the composition rule to get:

 $\begin{array}{c|c} P' \vdash_{S}^{C} \mathcal{P}[a] & P' \vdash_{S}^{C} \text{ request } \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b \\ \text{names}(\mathcal{P}[a]) \cap \text{names}(\text{request } \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b) = \emptyset \\ \text{labels}(\mathcal{P}[a]) \cap \text{labels}(\text{request } \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b) = \emptyset \end{array}$

 $P' \vdash_{S}^{C} \mathcal{P}[a] \parallel request \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b$

• Case Black-box Send Reply

From the definition of the rule, we have

 $a \neq b$ $\mathcal{P}[a] \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}[a \parallel \text{reply } \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b]$

where $P = \mathcal{P}[a]$ and $P' = \mathcal{P}[a] \| \text{reply } \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b]$. We also have from our congruence rules that

 $\mathcal{P}[a \parallel \text{reply } \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b] = \mathcal{P}[a] \parallel \text{reply } \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b$

. We also have that $P \vDash_S^C P$. We can re-use the proof derivation of that to construct $P' \vdash_S^C \mathcal{P}[\[a]\]$. P' can be used in place of P on the left-hand side as it contains the same relevant processes to the blame-consistent-with-provenance relation. We can now construct a new derivation for P'. We can use the base message well-formed rule along with the composition rule to get:

$P' \vdash_{S}^{C} \mathcal{P}[a]$	$P' \vdash_S^C$ reply # <i>n</i> from <i>a</i> containing <i>s</i> to <i>b</i>
$names(\mathcal{P}[a])$	\cap names(reply # <i>n</i> from <i>a</i> containing <i>s</i> to <i>b</i>) = Ø
labels($\mathcal{P}[a])$	\cap labels(reply # <i>n</i> from <i>a</i> containing <i>s</i> to <i>b</i>) = Ø

 $P' \vdash_S^C \mathcal{P}[a] \parallel reply \#n \text{ from } a \text{ containing } s \text{ to } b$

• Case Black-box Receive

From the definition of the rule, we have

 $\mathcal{P}[a \parallel m \text{ to } a] \rightarrow \mathcal{P}[a]$

where $P = \mathcal{P}[\underline{a} || m$ to a] and $P' = \mathcal{P}[\underline{a}]$. We also have that $P \vdash_S^C P$. We can re-use the proof derivation of that to construct $P' \vdash_S^C \mathcal{P}[\underline{a}]$ by removing the part of the derivation that included the rule used for the received message. P' can be used in place of P on the left-hand side as it contains the same relevant processes to the blame-consistent-with-provenance relation. With this, we can now construct a new derivation for P' directly to get $P' \vdash_S^C \mathcal{P}[\underline{a}]$.

Case Adapter Send Enhanced

From the definition of the rule, we have

$$(k, \checkmark) = \text{contract}_{\text{for}_{\sigma}}(b, m) \qquad \sigma', \hat{m} = \text{lift}_{\sigma}(k, \checkmark, m, l)$$
$$\mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l}(\sigma, P^{a} \parallel m \text{ to } b)] \rightarrow \mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a}) \parallel \hat{m} \text{ to } b]$$

where $P = \mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma, P^{a} \parallel m \text{ to } b)]$ and $P' = \mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a}) \parallel \hat{m}$ to b]. From Theorems A.2 and A.4, we can show that $\mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})] \vdash_{S}^{C} \operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})$. We note that we can use P' in place of $\mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})]$ as it contains everything but the extra enhanced message, so all derivations will still hold for P'. Since the labels came from the store which is well-formed, along with the confirmation status, the blame premises for the message hold. That is, $\forall l \in \widetilde{l}$. $P \Vdash$ blame l for b satisfies $k \langle \operatorname{index}(m) \rangle$ and $\forall l \in \widetilde{l_{id}}$. $P \Vdash$ blame l for identified(m) We can now set up the following derivation.

$\hat{m} = P \vdash_{S}^{C} m$ with {se-blame:= \tilde{l} ; id-conf:=c; id-blame:= \hat{l}	\widetilde{id} to b
k = C(b) type $(m) == r$	req
$\{\text{identified}(m) \mapsto c\} \leq C \forall l \in \tilde{l}. P \Vdash \text{blame } l \text{ for } b \text{ satisfi}$	es k (index (m))
$\forall l \in \widetilde{l_{id}}$. $P \Vdash$ blame l for identified (m)	
$P' \vdash^C_S \hat{m}$ to b	$P' \vdash_S^C \operatorname{mon}^l(\sigma', P^a)$
names $(\hat{m}$ to $b) \cap$ names $(ext{mon}^l(\sigma'))$	$(P^a)) = \emptyset$
$ ext{labels}(\hat{m} ext{ to } b) \cap ext{labels}(ext{mon}^l(\sigma$	$(P^{a}) = \emptyset$
$P' \vdash_{S}^{C} \mathcal{P}[mon^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})] \parallel \hat{m}$	to b

• Case Adapter Receive Enhanced

From the definition of the rule, we have

$$\begin{array}{l} (k,\checkmark) = \operatorname{contract_for}_{\sigma}(b,\hat{m}) \quad \sigma',m = \operatorname{lower}_{\sigma}(k,\checkmark,m) \\ \\ \mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma,P^{a}) \parallel \hat{m} \text{ to } a] \to \mathcal{P}[\operatorname{mon}^{l}(\sigma',P^{a} \parallel m \text{ to } a)] \end{array}$$

where $P = \mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l}(\sigma, P^{a}) || \hat{m}$ to a] and $P' = \mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a} || m \text{ to } a)]$. Since the enhanced message is well-formed, we can use Theorems A.3 and A.4 to get that the new adapter state σ' is well-formed. Additionally, all unenhanced messages are well-formed, so we can use the parallel composition rule to get

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
\hline P' \vdash^{C}_{S} m \text{ to } a \\
\hline P' \vdash^{C}_{S} \text{ mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a}) \\
\text{names}(\text{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})) \cap \text{names}(m \text{ to } a) = \emptyset \\
\hline P' \vdash^{C}_{S} \mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l}(\sigma', P^{a}) \parallel m \text{ to } a]
\end{array}$$

• Case Adapter Send Unenhanced

From the definition of the rule, we have

$$\begin{array}{c} (k,\mathbf{x}) = \texttt{contract}_\texttt{for}_{\sigma}(b,m) \\ \sigma', \hat{m} = \texttt{lift}_{\sigma}(\mathbf{x},k,m,l) \quad \sigma'', m = \texttt{lower}_{\sigma'}(k,\mathbf{x},\hat{m}) \\ \\ \mathcal{P}[\texttt{mon}^{l}(\sigma,P^{a} \parallel m \text{ to } b)] \rightarrow \mathcal{P}[\texttt{mon}^{l}(\sigma'',P^{a}) \parallel m \text{ to } b] \end{array}$$

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where $P = \mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l}(\sigma, P^{a} || m \text{ to } b)]$ and $P' = \mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l}(\sigma'', P^{a}) || m \text{ to } b]$. We can use Theorems A.2 to A.4 to get that the new adapter state σ'' is well-formed. Additionally, all unenhanced messages are well-formed, so we can use the composition rule to get

$$\begin{array}{c|c}\hline P' \vdash^{C}_{S} m \text{ to } b \\ \hline P' \vdash^{C}_{S} m \text{ to } b \\ \hline names(mon^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})) \cap names(m \text{ to } b) = \emptyset \\ \hline labels(mon^{l}(\sigma', P^{a})) \cap labels(m \text{ to } b) = \emptyset \\ \hline P' \vdash^{C}_{S} \mathcal{P}[mon^{l}(\sigma', P^{a}) \parallel m \text{ to } b] \end{array}$$

• Case Adapter Receive Unenhanced From the definition of the rule, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & (k,c) = \texttt{contract_for}_{\sigma}(a,m) \\ & \sigma', \hat{m} = \texttt{lift}_{\sigma}(\mathbf{x},m,\dagger) \quad \sigma'', m = \texttt{lower}_{\sigma'}(k,\mathbf{x},\hat{m}) \\ & \mathcal{P}[\texttt{mon}^{l}(\sigma,P^{a}) \parallel m \text{ to } a] \rightarrow \mathcal{P}[\texttt{mon}^{l}(\sigma'',P^{a} \parallel m \text{ to } a)] \end{aligned}$$

where $P = \mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l}(\sigma, P^{a}) || m \text{ to } a]$ and $P' = \mathcal{P}[\text{mon}^{l}(\sigma'', P^{a} || m \text{ to } a)]$. We can use Theorems A.2 to A.4 to get that the new adapter state σ'' is well-formed. Additionally, all unenhanced messages are well-formed, so we can use the composition rule to get

 $\begin{array}{c|c} \hline P' \vdash_S^C m \text{ to } a \\ \hline names(mon^l(\sigma'', P^a)) \cap names(m \text{ to } a) = \emptyset \\ P' \vdash_S^C \mathcal{P}[mon^l(\sigma'', P^a)) \cap labels(m \text{ to } a) = \emptyset \\ \hline P' \vdash_S^C \mathcal{P}[mon^l(\sigma'', P^a \parallel m \text{ to } a)] \end{array}$

• Case Adapter Bypass Send and Receive

The adapter state is not changed and all unenhanced messages are well-formed so we can simply use the composition rule to form the new derivation of well-formedness.

With all rules of the reduction relation satisfying preservation of well-formedness, the proof is complete.

	-

Correct Blame. If well-formed $P_1 = \mathcal{P}_1[\operatorname{mon}^l(\sigma_1, P_1^a)]$ and $P_1 \to P_2$ and $P_2 = \mathcal{P}_2[\operatorname{mon}^l(\sigma_2, P_2^a)]$ and errors $\sigma_2 = \{le\} \cup \operatorname{errors}_{\sigma_1}$ then (1) if $le = \operatorname{Pre}(se, l_e)$, then

(1) If
$$le = Pre(se, l_e)$$
, then
(a) if $P_1 = \mathcal{P}[mon^l(\sigma_1, P^a || m \text{ to } b)]$ and
 $P_2 = \mathcal{P}[mon^l(\sigma_2, P^a) || m' \text{ to } b]$ then $l_e = l$
(b) if $P_1 = \mathcal{P}[mon^l(\sigma_1, P^a) || m \text{ to } a]$ and
 $P_2 = \mathcal{P}[mon^l(\sigma_2, P^a || m \text{ to } a)]$ then $l_e = \dagger$
(2) if $le = Post(se, \tilde{l})$, then $\forall l \in \tilde{l}$. $P_2 \Vdash$ blame l for se .

PROOF. The first case (precondition error) is a direct result of the reduction rules for receiving a message and the lift metafunction for contract checking. The second case (postcondition error) is a direct result of well-formedness (specifically $\forall se \mapsto \tilde{l}c \in blame_{\sigma'}, l \in \tilde{l}. P \Vdash blame l \text{ for } se$) and the lift metafunction for contract checking.

B FULL SPECIFICATIONS

B.1 Evernote

```
1 service UserStore {
```

- 2 getNoteStoreUrl(authToken)
- 3 @where index is « authToken »
- 4 @identifies NoteStore at « result » with index « authToken »
- 5

```
6 getUser(authToken)
```

7 @where index is « authToken »

```
8 @requires « length(authToken) > 0 »
```

```
9 }
```

```
10 service NoteStore {
```

```
11 listNotebooks(authToken)
```

```
12 @where index is « authToken »
```

- 13 **@requires** « length(authToken) > 0 »
- 14

```
15 listLinkedNotebooks(authToken)
```

```
16 @where index is « authToken »
```

- 17 @foreach notebook in « result » identifies NoteStore at « notebook.noteStoreUrl »
- 18 with index « authToken + notebook.shareKey »
- 19 @ensures « for notebook in result: assert(notebook.shareKey != None) »

```
2021 getSharedNotebookByAuth(authToken)
```

22 @where index is « authToken »

23 @identifies NoteStore at receiver with index « result.authToken »

```
24
```

25 authenticateToSharedNotebook(shareKey, authToken)

```
26 @where index is « shareKey + authToken »
```

```
27 @identifies NoteStore at receiver with index « result.authenticationToken »
```

```
28 @requires « length(shareKey) > 0 »
```

```
29
```

```
30 findNotes(authToken, filter, offset, maxNotes)
```

```
31 @where index is « authToken »
```

```
32 @requires « offset >= 0 »
```

```
33 @ensures « result.totalNotes <= maxNotes and result.totalNotes == length(result.notes) »
```

```
@ensures «for note in result:
```

```
36 try: UUID(note.notebookGuid, version=4)
```

```
37 except ValueError: return False
```

```
38 »
```

```
39 @ensures «
```

```
40 for note in result:
```

```
41 for resource in note.resources:
```

```
42 assert (resource.mime in mimetypes.types_map.values())
```

```
43 »
```

```
44 }
```

B.2 Twitter

```
1 from rfc822 import parsedate_tz
2 service TwitterOAuth {
     /oauth/access token(reg)
3
     @identifies Twitter at receiver with index
4
5
        « 'oauth:' + parse_querystring(result.content).get('oauth_token') »
6 }
 7
8 service Twitter {
     /1.1/status/user timeline.json(request)
9
     @where index is « 'oauth:' + request['headers'].get('Authorization') »
10
11 }
12
13 service TwitterTweets {
     /1.1/friends/list.json(request)
14
     @where index is « 'u' + request['args'].get('user_id', request['args'].get('screen_name')) »
15
     @requires « 'user_id' in request['args'] or 'screen_name' in request['args']»
16
     @requires « request['args'].get('count', 0) >= 0 and 'Authorization' in request['headers'] »
17
     @ensures « type(result['body']['users']) == list »
18
     @foreach f in « result['body']['users'] » identifies TwitterTweets
19
       at « request['headers']['Host'] » with index « "u" + f['id_str'] »
20
21
     /1.1/statuses/user_timeline.json(request)
22
     @where index is « 'u' + request['args'].get('user_id', request['args'].get('screen_name')) »
23
     @requires « 'Authorization' in request['headers'] and \
24
                ('user_id' in request['args'] or 'screen_name' in request['args']) »
25
     @foreach tweet in « result['body'] » identifies TwitterTweets at « request['headers']['Host'] »
26
        with index « "t" + tweet['id_str'] »
27
     @ensures « 'count' not in request['args'] or length(result) <= max(200, request['args']['count']) »
28
     @ensures « for tweet in result['body']: assert parsedate_tz(tweet['created_at']) != None »
29
30
     /1.1/statuses/retweet/<id>.json(request)
31
     @where index is « "t" + request['args']['tweet_id'] »
32
     @ensures « 'errors' not in result['body'] »
33
34 }
```

36:10

```
B.3 Chess
```

```
1 from chess.pgn import read_game
2
3 service Chess {
     GetMyGames(username, password)
4
5
     @foreach g in « result » identifies Chess at receiver with index « (g['gameld'], moves(g), False) »
     @foreach g in « result » identifies Chess at receiver with index « (g['gameld'], moves(g), True) »
6
     when « g['drawOffered'] == True »
7
     @ensures «
8
       for game in result:
9
         try: read game(game['moves'])
10
         except: return False »
11
12
     MakeAMove(username, password, gameId, resign, acceptDraw, movecount, myMove,
13
                  offerDraw, claimDraw, myMessage)
14
     @where index is « (gameld, movecount, acceptDraw) »
15
     @ensures « result != "NoDrawWasOffered" and result != "InvalidGameID" »
16
17 }
```

C ADDITIONAL CASE STUDY: AIRLINE RESERVATIONS

The airline reservation open-source case study [McGregor et al. 2012; Wilde et al. 2012] models an airline reservation system, and was developed to provide researchers and educators with a simple but complete service-oriented application. With respect to the challenges we discuss in Section 1, it demonstrates that (i) Whip can operate on top of yet another interface abstraction (SOAP with a WSDL interface); and (ii) Whip can express and enforce contracts between components implemented in different languages (Python and PHP for client and server respectively).

The text documentation of the case study informally describes the component interfaces, and the WSDL specification captures some of the interface's syntactic properties. However, WSDL cannot express many of the properties in the text documentation. We wrote Whip contracts for some of these additional properties.

Well-formed passenger information. The documentation states that passengers' first and last names cannot contain whitespace. This ensures consistent treatment of passenger names by all services and applies to all services that use passenger data.

With Whip, we are able to ensure that passenger information is well-formed by adding the following tags for the bookSeat operation to the contract of the airline server (We also add similar tags for other uses of passenger information.)

bookSeat(bookingRequestNumber, flightId, passenger)

@requires « ' ' not in passenger.firstName »

@requires « ' ' not in passenger.lastName »

We tested the effectiveness of this contract by removing the passenger data validity check from the reference implementation of the bookSeat operation. Similar defensive code that checks this property appears in multiple places in the case study's code base. Without Whip and the defensive code, a client is able to book a flight with invalid passenger information. With Whip and the above contract, the violation was reported and the client was blamed. Thus the Whip contract is as effective as defensive code injected in multiple places in the service's code.